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THE THREE STAGES OF HERNANDEZ:




Before a .federal court can be required to abstain from hearing a case rais-
ing constitutional claims, the state court proceedings must provide an
adequate forum for those actions. Whether the state forum is adequate is
subject to determination by the federal court. This principle was recently
underscored during the three stages of one significant case concerning the
Illinois Attachment Act.1
In Hernandez v. Danaher,2 the District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois determined that the Illinois Attachment Act was "patently and fla-
grantly" unconstitutional because it failed to provide both notice and a hear-
ing prior to an attachment. 3 Less than two years later, the Supreme Court
reversed the district court in Trainor v. Hernandez.4  The Trainor Court
found that the abstention principles of Younger v. Harris I and Huffman v.
Pursue 6 require non-interference by the federal courts in order that the
state courts may construe their own statutes in the face of constitutional
challenges. 7 The abstention doctrine states that although a federal court has
jurisdiction, it may decline a proceeding in order to avoid needless conflict
with a state regarding the proper administration of its own affairs.8 Absten-
tion also presupposes that an adequate remedy for federal constitutional
claims is available in the state court. 9
Trainor, however, expressly left unanswered the question of whether the
Illinois Attachment Act provided an opportunity to raise constitutional chal-
lenges. 10 On remand, the district court in Hernandez v. Finley "I evaluated
the procedures of the Illinois Act and found that no such opportunity existed
1. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 11, § 1-43 (1977).
2. 405 F. Supp. 757 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
3. In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Court took exception to the rule of nonin-
terference by federal courts, and stated that where the challenged statute is "patently and fla-
grantly" violative of the Constitution the federal courts were justified in intervening.
4. 431 U.S. 434 (1977).
5. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
6. 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
7. 431 U.S. at 442. See also note 42 infra.
8. See Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943), where the Court held that federal
courts of equity should exercise discretionary power with proper regard for the rightful inde-
pendence of state governments. Id. at 318. See also note 43 infra.
9. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973).
10. 431 U.S. at 447.
11. 471 F. Supp. 516 (N.D. I11. 1978), affd sub nom. Quern v. Hernandez, 99 S. Ct. 1488
(1979).
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in the Illinois courts. 12 While the district court did not actually disregard
Trainor, it nonetheless reinstated its earlier Danaher decision.' 3 The court
premised its reinstatement on the fact that abstention is not proper where
state court proceedings are inadequate. 14 Thus, the district court addressed
the merits of the case and again found the Illinois Attachment Act uncon-
stitutional because the Act failed to require adequate notice and a hearing. '5
The requirements of notice and a hearing are fundamental principles in
the area of debtor-creditor relations. 16 In formulating the due process re-
quirements as to attachments, the Supreme Court has developed two impor-
tant concepts. First, parties whose rights are affected by a state's judicial
processes are entitled to a hearing. 17 Second, notice and an opportunity to
be heard "must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful man-
ner." '8 However, in light of Hernandez v. Finley, it now appears that the
state court process must also provide an opportunity to present federal con-
stitutional challenges. 19
This Note will discuss the requirements of an adequate remedy at law and
will analyze the inadequacies of the Illinois Attachment Act in light of the
abstention principles of Younger v. Harris and Huffman v. Pursue. Atten-
tion also will be given to the due process requirements of prior notice and a
hearing in the attachment area of debtor-creditor relations. Finally, due to
the recent affirmation of Hernandez v. Finley by the Supreme Court in
Quern v. Hernandez,20 suggestions for amendments to the present Act will
be advanced.
FACTS
On October 30, 1974, the Illinois Department of Public Aid (IDPA) filed
suit in the Circuit Court of Cook County against Maria and Juan Hernan-
dez. 2 1 The IDPA alleged that Juan and Maria Hernandez fraudulently con-
cealed assets while applying for and receiving public aid. Although the
12. Id. at 522.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 520.
15. Id. at 522. The decision of the district court was summarily affirmed in the recent
decision of Quern v. Hernandez, 99 S. Ct. 1488 (1979), where the Illinois Department of Public
Aid appealed the Hernandez v. Finley decision to the Supreme Court.
16. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The pertinent section of this amendment provides: "Nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law ......
17. Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. 233 (1863). See Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385 (1914);
Hovey v. Elliot, 167 U.S. 409 (1897); Windsor v. McVergh, 93 U.S. 274 (1876).
18. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
19. See also Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973).
20. 99 S. Ct. 1488 (1979).
21. Hernandez v. Danaher, 405 F. Supp. 757, 758 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
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applicable statute 22 provided for criminal remedies, 23 the IDPA filed only a
civil action seeking the return of the money. 24
Simultaneously, the IDPA filed an attachment complaint, 25 which resulted
in an attachment of the debtors' funds. 26  The plaintiff-debtors received
notice of the attachment freezing their credit union savings account when
they received the writ, complaint, and affidavit in support of the writ.27
The plaintiffs failed to file an answer to the attachment and the underlying
complaint. 28  Instead, they filed a lawsuit in the District Court for the
22. ILL. REv STAT. ch. 23, § 11-21 (1977) provides:
Any person who by means of any false statement, willful misrepresentation, or fail-
ure to notify the county department or local government unit, as the case may be,
of a change in his status as required by Sections 11-18 and 11-19, for the purpose of
preventing the denial, cancellation or suspension of his grant, or a variation in the
amount thereof, or through other fraudulent device obtains or attempts to obtain, or
aids or abets any person in obtaining financial aid under this Code to which he is
not entitled, shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor . . . [Tihe offender shall be
subject to the penalties for perjury as provided in Section 32-2 of the Criminal
Code of 1961 .... A person who receives financial aid for which he was not eligi-
ble . . . shall be answerable to the county department . . . for refunding the entire
amount of any aid received ....
23. Two remedies were made available to the state under Illinois law. Either Hernandez
could have been charged with perjury, or the state could have proceeded civilly and sought the
return of the monies. 431 U.S. at 435-36.
24. Id.
25. In filing for an attachment under the Illinois Act, it is necessary under section 1 to
allege one of nine grounds in order for an attachment to issue. The nine grounds include: the
debtor being a non-resident of Illinois; the debtor concealing himself to avoid service of process;
the debtor departing or planning to depart from the state, taking the property with him to the
injury of creditors; the debtor within two years prior to the filing of the writ fraudulently con-
veying or concealing his effects or other property so as to hinder or delay creditors; the debt
being litigated was fraudulently contracted on the part of the debtor and was reduced to writing
and signed by the debtor, his agent, or his attorney. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 11, §1 (1977).
The plaintiff-debtors specifically attacked those sections authorizing a writ of attachment based
upon a creditor's allegation of debtor fraud. Hernandez v. Danaher, 405 F. Supp. at 761.
26. The sheriff executed the writ on November 15, 1974, thereby freezing the plaintiffs'
credit union savings account. Section 8 of the Illinois Attachment Act provided the sheriff with
the right to execute the writ of attachment against those properties described. In the event that
no description was available, the sheriff could execute against lands, tenements, goods, chattels,
credits, monies, and effects of the debtor. Additionally, the sheriff could execute against lands
and tenements to which the debtor had or may have claimed any equitable interest, and which
were sufficient to satisfy the creditor's claims. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 11, § 8 (1977).
27. Hernandez v. Danaher, 405 F. Supp. at 759. The plaintiffs appeared in court on
November 18, 1974, and were informed that the matter would be continued to December 19,
1974, which was the court date for a hearing on the underlying claim. Additionally, the writ of
attachment had issued from the court clerk automatically, i.e., without judicial control. 431 U.S.
at 437. A plaintiff-creditor is examined only by a judge before issuance of a writ of attachment
when the underlying action sounds in tort, whereupon the judge determines whether the dam-
ages suffered exceed the amount of the attachment. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 11, § 2 (1977).
28. The return date, or hearing on the attachment, would have been not less than ten nor
more than sixty days after the attachment had Hernandez proceeded under the Attachment Act.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 11, § 6 (1977).
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Northern District of Illinois seeking the return of the attached monies.2 9
Additionally, the plaintiff-debtors alleged that the Attachment Act was un-
constitutional in that it deprived them of their property without due process
of law.
The Lower Court's Decision: Hernandez v. Danaher
The lower court's decision in Danaher addressed two issues: (1) whether
the abstention doctrine articulated in Huffman v. Pursue 30 prevented the
district court from intervening in the state civil proceeding; and (2) if absten-
tion was not required, whether the challenged portions of the Illinois At-
tachment Act were unconstitutional. 31
The district court applied the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court
in Younger v. Harris,32 noting the following two extraordinary circumstances
that allow federal interference: a showing that an irreparable injury is great
and immediate, and a showing that the statute in question is flagrantly and
patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions. 33 The Huffman de-
29. Hernandez v. Danaher, 405 F. Supp. 757 (N.D. 11. 1975). The named defendants to
the action were the officials of the IDPA, the court clerks of the Illinois Circuit Courts, and the
sheriffs in Illinois. The relief sought by the plaintiffs included an injunction forbidding the
named parties from issuing or serving writs under the Act. Upon resolution of the case, the
particular relief requested had been granted. Id. at 762.
30. 420 U.S. 592 (1975). In Huffman, the State of Ohio brought a civil action under a
nuisance statute and called for the closing of a theatre intended for the showing of obscene
movies. The Huffman Court concluded that such a proceeding was closely related to that under
a criminal statute, particularly because the statute at issue gave the State of Ohio an exclusive
right of action. Id. at 605.
In Hernandez, the State of Illinois argued that the Attachment Act was within the purview of
Huffman, as the state had a criminal right of action available but decided to proceed civilly. 431
U.S. at 435.
31. Hernandez v. Danaher, 405 F. Supp. at 760.
32. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Harris was indicted for passing out leaflets in violation of the
California Syndicalism Act. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11400 (West 1970). Harris filed a complaint in
the federal district court seeking to enjoin the prosecution by alleging that the act inhibited the
exercise of one's first amendment rights. The Supreme Court, however, clearly enunciated the
abstention policy and found that historically, the federal courts usually have allowed state courts
to try cases free of federal interference. 401 U.S. at 43-44.
The Court provided three reasons for noninterference. First, the doctrine of equity prohibits
a court of equity from enjoining a criminal prosecution when the moving part has an adequate
remedy at law. Second, the notion of comity asks the federal courts to give proper respect to
state functions. Third, comity recognizes the separateness of state and federal governments,
requiring states to be allowed to perform their own functions. The Court described these prin-
ciples as "Our Federalism." Id. at 43-44.
The Supreme Court concluded that Harris had an adequate remedy at law because no allega-
tions were made that the state court action was brought in bad faith or for harassment. Id. at
49. Had the aforementioned allegations been made, the federal court would have had a basis for
intervention. Id. at 54. Thus, the finding that Harris had an adequate remedy at law also was a
finding that the federal constitutional claims could be disposed of in the state court action.
33. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53 (1971). See also Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117
(1951) (federal courts should refuse to intervene in state criminal proceedings); Spielman Motor
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cision extended Younger one step further and made its provisions applicable
to quasi-criminal proceedings. 34  The district court noted, however, that
Huffman involved civil proceedings "in aid of and closely related to criminal
statutes." 35  Therefore, it denied Huffman's applicability to the Danaher
case and held that the Illinois Attachment Act was not of a quasi-criminal
nature.
36
Having overcome the abstention hurdle, the district court concluded that
various sections of the Illinois Attachment Act 37 "patently and flagrantly"
violated due process.38 Thus, the court found that a debtor's property could
be attached through the mere filing of an affidavit by a creditor alleging,
in statutory language, any of the nine circumstances under which a writ
would issue. 39  The Danaher court also found that the Illinois Attachment
Act did not provide the defendant-debtor with an absolute right to a hearing
immediately after seizure.4 0  Thus, there was inadequate due process pro-
tection.
The Supreme Court's Decision: Trainor v. Hernandez
On appeal, the Supreme Court, in Trainor v. Hernandez,41 reversed the
district court on general principles of abstention and federalism. 4 2  The
Sales Co. v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89 (1935) (to justify interference there must be exceptional cir-
cumstances); Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240 (1926) (set up and rely upon your defense in state
courts).
34. Huffman v. Pursue, 420 U.S. 592, 607 (1975).
35. Hernandez v. Danaher, 405 F. Supp. at 759. The district court in Danaher noted that
the Huffman Court did not extend abstention totally to civil cases, and observed that the cause
of action in Huffman was more akin to criminal proceedings than most civil cases. Id. at 760.
36. Id. at 759.
37. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 11, §§ 1, 2, 6, 8, 10, 14 (1977). See Hernandez v. Danaher, 405 F.
Supp. at 760. These statutory sections spell out the provisions to be followed in the writ of
attachment process. Section 1 states the nine grounds which may cause a writ to issue. Section
2 allows a writ to issue automatically unless it sounds in tort, in which case the plaintiff is
examined before a judge under oath. Section 6 provides the writ of attachment form and the
return date for the attachment hearing. Section 8 names the properties subject to seizure by the
sheriff. Section 10 provides for service of the writ upon the debtor. Section 14 requires the
sheriff to retain possession of the attached property pending court judgment, unless the debtor
posts a bond.
38. Hernandez v. Danaher, 405 F. Supp. at 760. The court was thereby able to avoid
application of the Younger abstention policy since a patent and flagrant violation of an express
constitutional prohibition has been identified by the Supreme Court as a specific example of
great and immediate "irreparable injury" justifying non-abstention. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.
37, 53 (1971).
39. Hernandez v. Danaher, 405 F. Supp. at 762. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 11, § 1 (1977).
40. Hernandez v. Danaher, 405 F. Supp. at 762. The plaintiffs alleged that it was the prac-
tice of the Illinois courts not to grant an immediate hearing on the attachment issue and to hear
the claim in conjunction with the underlying claim causing the writ of attachment to issue. See
Hawkins v. Albright, 70 Ill. 87, 90 (1873); Page v. Dillon, 61 I11. App. 282, 288 (1895).
41. 431 U.S. 434 (1977).
42. Id. at 441. The Supreme Court, in taking this position, was following its earlier decision
in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Therein, the Court felt that abstention should be the
90519791
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majority noted the significance of the Younger case and stated that, under
the basic doctrine of equity jurisprudence, "courts of equity should not act,
and particularly should not act to restrain a criminal prosecution, when the
moving party has an adequate remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable
injury if denied equitable relief. " 43  The Trainor Court particularly em-
phasized raising one's defenses in the state court, thereby exhausting those
remedies," unless exhaustion of state remedies would not afford adequate
protection to the federal constitutional claims. 45  The Court held that absent
policy of the federal court where the parties had an adequate remedy at law and would not
suffer irreparable harm if denied equitable relief. Id. at 43-44. But see note 48 infra.
Abstention has been viewed by the Supreme Court as a discretionary judicial doctrine de-
signed primarily to promote federalism. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 196-208 (2d
ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT].One commentor has stated:
Clearly, then, it is appropriate to talk of federal court abstention only when both of
the following elements are present: (1) the federal court has jurisdiction to hear the
case, and (2) federal court action would somehow operate to produce friction be-
tween the state and national governments, thereby rending, or at least creasing, the
fragile fabric of federalism.
Burton, The Abstention Doctrine: Some Recent Developments, 46 TUL. L. REV. 762, 763 (1972).
Abstention often involves two related doctrines: exhaustion of state remedies and comity.
Exhaustion of state remedies has been characterized as "a jurisdictional or a pseudo-jurisdic-
tional requirement." Hobbs. v. Thompson, 448 F.2d 456, 461 (5th Cir. 1971) quoting Moreno
v. Henckel, 431 F.2d 1299, 1307 (5th Cir. 1970). As judicially evolved, the exhaustion doctrine
requires the petitioner to avail himself of state remedies before seeking relief in te federal
court. See WRIGHT, supra at 187.
Comity, in contrast to the exhaustion-of-state-remedies doctrine, is a broad concept underly-
ing and supporting federal court abstention. Basically, comity is the recognition that "the entire
country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief
that the national government will fare best if the states and their institutions are left free to
perform their separate functions in their separate ways." Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44
(1971).
43. 431 U.S. at 440-41. The Supreme Court further adopted the position that the federal
court's jurisdiction would act as a "direct aspersion" on the capabilities of the state courts, and
would be disruptive of a legitimate state function. Id. at 441. See, e.g., Beal v. Missouri Pac.
R.R., 312 U.S. 45, 50 (1941), which declared that courts of equity should give "scrupulous
regard [to] the rightful independence of state governments" and Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S.
452, 462 (1974), which held that intervention reflects negatively upon a state court's abilities.
See also Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972); Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561
(1947).
44. 431 U.S. at 440-41. See Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124 (1975) (policy of equitable
restraint is founded on the premise that a state ordinarily provides a fair and sufficient oppor-
tunity for vindication of federal constitutional rights); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 577
(1973) (dismissal of federal suit presupposes the opportunity to have federal issues decided by a
competent state tribunal). But see Beal v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 312 U.S. 45, 50 (1941) (scrupu-
lous regard must be had for rightful independence of state governments).
45. 431 U.S. at 441. See Tully v. Griffin, 429 U.S. 68 (1976) (state court failure to provide
plain, speedy, efficient relieo; Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620 (1946) (remedy was so
uncertain that it was speculative whether the state court afforded full protection to the federal
right); Mountain States Power Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of Mont., 299 U.S. 167 (1936) (a
plain, speedy, and efficient remedy cannot be predicated upon the problematical outcome of
future litigation); Hopkins v. Southern Cal. Tel. Co., 275 U.S. 393 (1928) (no clear adequate
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this exception, interference by federal courts would reflect negatively upon a
state court's ability to resolve constitutional claims. 46
Finding that the state civil suit was quasi-criminal in nature the Supreme
Court applied the abstention principles of Huffman. 47 The Court held that
because the proceeding giving rise to the plaintiffs' suit was an action filed
by the state to recover fraudulently obtained funds, the attachment proceed-
ing was arguably criminal in nature.48  The Court reasoned that the underly-
remedy at law, therefore equity proceeding is permissible); Wallace v. Hines, 253 U.S. 66
(1920) (ought not leave plaintiffs to speculate as to what the state court might say if an action
were brought).
46. 431 U.S. at 443.
47. Id. at 444.
48. Id. It is important to note that at the time of the Danaher decision the abstention
principle had only been applied in the context of criminal and quasi-criminal proceedings. By
the time that the Supreme Court had an opportunity to review the Trainor case, Juidice v.
Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977), had been decided. This decision extended the abstention principles
to civil suits. Id. at 334. Therefore, the Court, in Trainor, placed less significance on the need
to fit the case within the quasi-criminal category. In Juidice, the Supreme Court stated that the
Younger doctrine of non-intervention did not rest on whether a state criminal process was in-
volved, but rather on the notion of 'comity' which gives proper respect for state functions. Id.
The Court, in Juidice, held that:
[Plerhaps it [comity] is not quite as important as is the State's interest in the en-
forcement of its criminal laws . . . or even its interest in the maintenance of a
quasi-criminal proceeding such as was involved in Huffman, supra. But we think it
is of sufficiently great import as to require application of the principles of those
cases.
Id.
Labeling a cause of action as criminal, quasi-criminal, or civil appears, therefore, to be of
secondary significance to the Supreme Court. The Court's primary consideration is the state's
interest in vindicating the regular operation of its judicial system.
Justice Blackmun, concurring in Trainor, noted that in previous cases employing the Younger
doctrine the Court imposed a requirement that states show an important interest before absten-
tion is required-whether it is criminal, quasi-criminal, or civil. 431 U.S. at 448 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring). But where the state's interest is more attenuated, Younger abstention is not applic-
able. Justice Blackmun cited Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1975), as an example of where
abstention was not required because a declaratory judgment was sought. In such a case, the
opportunity for adjudication of constitutional rights authorized by the Declaratory Judgment Act
becomes paramount. Justice Blackmun stated that the facts in Danaher support the finding that
the state had a substantial interest in the present suit in that it brought the suit in its sovereign
capacity to recover fraudulently obtained state funds, 431 U.S. at 449 (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring). The fact that the state proceeded civilly rather than criminally, according to Justice
Blackmun, should not be a factor in determining whether abstention applies. Id. at 449.
In Trainor, Justice Brennan forcefully dissented against the Court's decision to abstain, id. at
453, citing Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 342 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting). In Juidice, he
asserted that abstention had no application to civil suits grounded upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 431
U.S. at 377. Justice Brennan's position would be relevant here, as Hernandez filed a § 1983
cause of action. Moreover, to abstain, according to Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242
(1972), is contrary to the Congressional purpose behind § 1983: "The very purpose of § 1983
was to interpose the federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians of the
people's federal rights .... 407 U.S. at 242.
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ing suit and the accompanying writ of attachment were brought to vindicate
the important state policy of safeguarding the fiscal integrity of the public aid
program . 4 9
The Supreme Court also noted that the state possessed the option of vin-
dicating these policies through criminal prosecution.5 0 Additionally, the
Court asserted that the Younger and Huffman principles were broad enough
to apply to a federal court's interference with a civil action brought by the
state in its sovereign capacity.
5
'
The Supreme Court concluded that the extraordinary circumstances war-
ranting equitable relief under Younger were not present. 52  There was no
suggestion of bad faith or harassment, and contrary to the district court's
opinion, the Court held that the Illinois Act was not patently and flagrantly
unconstitutional in light of recent Supreme Court decisions in the area.
53
The Court also noted that the district court did not deal with one important
question requiring resolution: whether the plaintiffs could have presented
their federal due process challenge to the attachment statute in the state
proceeding. 54  Thereupon, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the
decision of the district court to resolve this remaining issue.
55
Justice Brennan also cited Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974), as additional support for
federal intervention where a § 1983 suit is brought to determine one's federal constitutional
rights. 431 U.S. at 456 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Steffel, unlike Hernandez, involved a federal
plaintiff who was threatened with criminal prosecution, as opposed to having an actual suit
pending. 415 U.S. at 452. The police already had threatened Steffel with arrest and prosecution
if he continued to pass out handbills in a shopping center. Steffel sought a declaratory judgment
that the Georgia criminal trespass statute was unconstitutional due to its interference with his
constitutionally protected activities. Id. at 454-55. The Supreme Court found that the require-
ments for Younger abstention did not have to be met before a declaratory judgment was issued.
Id. at 462. Since no state action was pending, there was no threat of duplicative legal proceed-
ings. This left unresolved only a determination as to whether declaratory relief was appropriate.
Declararory judgments are judged by the same standards as an injunction. Id. Historically,
the Declaratory Judgment Act was to be an alternative to injunctions, and the same tests were
not to be applied. Id. Also, the Steffel Court noted that § 1983 suits do not have an exhaustion
of state remedies requirement, due to the paramount role assigned to federal courts by Con-
gress to protect constitutional rights. Id. at 464.
49. 431 U.S. at 444.
50. Id.
51. Id. Sovereign power is defined as that power in a state to which none other is superior
or equal and which includes all the specific powers necessary to accomplish the legitimate ends
and purposes of government. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1568 (4th rev. ed. 1968).
52. 431 U.S. at 446.
53. Id. at 447. The two cases cited by the Court were North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-
Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975), and Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
54. 431 U.S. at 447.
55. Id. at 447-48.
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The District Court on Remand: Hernandez v. Finley
The district court in Hernandez v. Finley 56 reinstated its earlier judgment
of Hernandez v. Danaher.57  Reinstatement was premised on the finding
that the Illinois Attachment Act did not provide the plaintiffs with the op-
portunity to raise their federal due process claim, 58 and therefore the statute
deprived them of an adequate remedy at law. 59 The district court found
that the sole purpose of the attachment hearing was to determine the truth
and sufficiency of facts in the affidavit that caused the writ to issue, 60
thereby precluding an opportunity to raise any constitutional challenge. 6 '
Additionally, the court determined that when the right to raise constitutional
issues was available, yet denied, such a denial is interlocutory in nature and
does not create an immediate right of appeal. 62  The court stated that rul-
56. 471 F. Supp. 516, 522 (N.D. Ill. 1978), affd sub nor. Quern v. Hernandez, 99 S. Ct.
1488 (1979).
57. 405 F. Supp. 757 (N.D. Ill. 1975). Relying on the inadequacy of the Attachment Act's
protections of the constitutional claims, the district court addressed the merits of the case and
reinstated the prior judgment.
58. Hernandez v. Finley, 471 F. Supp. at 520.
59. In Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 335 (1977), the Court stated that for Younger absten-
tion to be invoked, the state proceeding must provide an opportunity to present federal claims.
The failure to avail oneself of such opportunities will not mean the state procedures were inade-
quate. Id. at 337. Therefore, it appears that the question of adequacy is resolved by the exis-
tence or nonexistence of such an opportunity.
Additionally, Justice Rehnquist, in Huffman, felt that the considerations of comity and
federalism which underlie Younger permit no truncation of the exhaustion of state remedies
requirement merely because chances of success on appeal are not auspicious. 420 U.S. 592, 610
(1975).
60. Herandez v. Finley, 471 F. Supp. at 519. See Schwabacker v. Rush, 81 Ill. 310 (1876);
Ridgeway v. Smith, 17 Il1. 33 (1855). Both cases held that if the debtor successfully traverses
the facts causing the writ of attachment to issue, the attachment shall be quashed. Neither case
addressed the right to raise issues not stated on the face of the affidavit causing the writ to
issue. See also ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 11, § 27 (1977), which states:
The defendant may answer, traversing the facts stated in the affidavit upon which
the attachment issued, which answer shall be verified by affidavit; and, if upon trial
thereon, the issue shall be found for the plaintiff, the defendant may answer the
complaint or file a motion directed thereto as in other cases, but if found for the
defendant, the attachment shall be quashed, and the costs of the attachment shall
be adjudged against the plaintiff, but the suit shall proceed to final judgment as
though commenced by summons.
61. Hernandez v. Finley, 471 F. Supp. at 519.
62. Id. See, e.g., American Mortgage Corp. v. First Nat'l Mortgage Co., 345 F.2d 527 (7th
Cir. 1965) (order denying request to quash writ is not final judgment); Smith v. Hodge, 13 Ill.
2d 197, 148 N.E.2d 793 (1958) (judgment quashing writ is not a final order and therefore not
appealable); Brignall v. Merkle, 296 Ill. App. 250, 16 N.E.2d 150 (1938) (attachment rests upon
the principle suit, and can not be appealed before final judgment of the main claim); Rabits v.
Live Oak, Perry -& Gulf R.R., 245 I11. App. 589 (1927) (attachment is merely an adjunct to the
main suit). See also ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 11, § 28 (1977), which provides:
No writ of attachment shall be quashed, nor the property taken thereon restored,
nor any garnishee discharged, nor any bond by him given canceled, nor any rule
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ings on the validity of an attachment would, therefore, not be final until the
underlying claim was resolved. 63 As a result, the court would have deter-
mined who was entitled to the attached property, thereby making any argu-
ments regarding the initial attachment moot. 64  Thus, the court held that
the Illinois Act provided an inadequate remedy at law. 65
INADEQUATE REMEDY AT LAW
The plaintiffs' major criticism of the Illinois Attachment Act was that their
ability to raise a constitutional challenge at the hearing was more "theoretical
than real." 66  In order for a defendant to raise constitutional claims at an
attachment proceeding, there must be an adequate statutory procedure.
Minimally, such a procedure must provide a "forum competent to vindicate
any constitutional objections interposed against those policies." 6 7  In addi-
tion, there should be an opportunity to raise both the federal and state is-
sues involved, and to have timely decisions made by a competent state tri-
bunal.68 Assuming that .the state court is an adequate forum to raise a con-
stitutional claim, it also must provide a "meaningful opportunity to appeal
any adverse ruling."8 9  Moreover, when a state remedy is uncertain, the
federal court must provide relief.70 The inadequacy of state remedies there-
fore provides the proper basis for assertion of jurisdiction by the federal
courts. 71
Although federal courts try to minimize their interference with state mat-
ters, 72 Justice Stevens, in his Trainor dissent, 73 noted that federal courts
entered against the sheriff discharged, on account of any insufficiency of the original
affidavit, writ of attachment bond to be filed, or the writ to be amended, in such
time and manner as the court shall direct; and in that event the cause shall proceed
as if such proceedings had originally been sufficient.
63. See note 62 supra.
64. Hernandez v. Finley, 471 F. Supp. at 520.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 519. See also Caulder v. Durham Hous. Auth., 433 F.2d 998, 1002 (4th Cir.
1970).
67. Huffman v. Pursue, 420 U.S. 592, 604- (1975).
68. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 577 (1975).
69. Hernandez v. Finley, 471 F. Supp. at 520.
70. See Tully v. Griffin, Inc., 429 U.S. 68, 76 (1976).
71. 431 U.S. at 444 (1977). See Grandco Corp. v. Rockford, 536 F.2d 197, 206 (7th Cir.
1976) (administrative proceedings with limited state court review of record of administrative
hearings); Caulder v. Durham Hous. Auth., 433 F.2d 998, 1002 (4th Cir. 1970) (only a theoreti-
cal right to appeal); Doe v. Maher, 414 F. Supp. 1368, 1376-77 (D. Conn. 1976) (unwed mother
had no means to challenge welfare statute requiring disclosure of putative father and institution
of paternity suit); Lessard v. Schmidt, 413 F. Supp. 1318, 1320 (E.D. Wis. 1976) (civil com-
mitment proceedings had questionable right of appeal of constitutional claims); Owens v. Hous-
ing Auth. of Stamford, 394 F. Supp. 1267, 1271 (D. Conn. 1975) (inability to appeal state
eviction case rendered ability to litigate issues in state court "more theoretical than real").
72. 431 U.S. at 464. See note 75 infra.
73. 431 U.S. at 460.
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have the right to review the adequacy of state court remedies. 74  The dis-
trict court in Hernandez v. Finley applied the minimal requirements of an
adequate state remedy to the Illinois Attachment Act and found that any
challenges to an attachment by the defendant would proceed under section
27 of the Act, 75 which provided the defendant with a right to challenge an
attachment and to request that it be quashed. 76  Section 28, however, speci-
fically limited those rights guaranteed under section 27. 7 7  Section 28 pro-
vided that if the plaintiff filed a legally sufficient affidavit, the writ could not
be quashed.7 8  Furthermore, with respect to a hearing to determine
whether a writ of attachment should issue, section 28 limited the issues to
whether the allegations contained therein were true. 79  Such limitations ap-
74. Id. Justice Stevens also recognized that the notion of non-interference began in the area
of taxpayer remedies. id. at 464. States do have a valid interest in collecting taxes or other
interests, and in an effort not to interfere with this legitimate concern, federal interference
should be limited. Tully v. Griffin, Inc., 429 U.S. 68 (1976). To effectuate this policy, Congress
specifically prohibits federal injunctions where a taxpayer has a "plain, speedy and efficient"
remedy under state law. Id. at 73. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976) provides: "The district courts shall
not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law
where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State." Thus,
Justice Stevens stated that the federal courts have available to them the right to determine
whether the state remedy is in fact "plain, speedy and efficient." 431 U.S. at 464.
The application of this principle to non-tax cases came with the formulation of the Younger
doctrine, which was developed from the same equitable principles applied to 28 U.S.C. § 1341
(1976). In the first Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress directed that equity was to be withheld if a
"'plain, adequate and complete remedy may be had at law." Scott v. Neely, 140 U.S. 106, 110
(1891). The Supreme Court, in Scott, noted:
Whenever, respecting any right violated, a court of law is competent to render a
judgment affording a plain, adequate and complete remedy, the party aggrieved
must seek his remedy in such court, not only because the defendant has a constitu-
tional right to a trial by jury, but because of the prohibition of the act of Congress
to pursue his remedy in such cases in a court of equity.
Id. at 110.
The Younger Court relied upon Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293
(1943), where the Court noted that while Congress in § 1341 had not specifically prohibited
declaratory judgments concerning the validity of state statutes, equitable principles nonetheless
required the same result: "[W]e are of the opinion that those considerations which have led
federal courts of equity to refuse to enjoin the collection of state taxes, save in exceptional cases,
require a like restraint in the use of declaratory judgment procedure." Id. at 299.
75. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 11, § 27 (1977).
76. See note 60 and accompanying text supra.
77. See note 62 and accompanying text supra. Where there is some question as to the
sufficiency of the affidavit, such writ may be amended in the time and manner as the court
directs, thereby making it impossible to quash the writ, as it would be legal and sufficient in its
amended form. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 11, § 28 (1977).
78. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 11, § 28 (1977).
79. See note 60 and accompanying text supra. Whether the procedures of §§ 27 and 28
provided adequate protection to the constitutional claim requires an examination of what is
"adequate." Adequacy is based on the premise of setting up one's defenses in state court, unless




pear to preclude constitutional challenges and therefore fail to provide a
minimally adequate remedy at law.8 0
The Illinois Attachment Act also failed to allow the opportunity for appeal
where the state court denied a motion to quash a writ of attachment. Case
law indicates that an order by an Illinois court denying defendant-debtor's
motion to quash a writ of attachment on due process grounds was regarded
as interlocutory and thus not appealable. 8 ' Therefore, if the debtor had a
constitutional challenge to be litigated at the attachment hearing, a rejection
of that challenge would not have carried with it an immediate right to ap-
peal. As a result, a ruling on the validity of the attachment would not have
become final until the underlying claim had been resolved. 82
The requirement that the debtor postpone the constitutional claim pend-
ing resolution of the underlying claim may have resulted in considerable
harm to the debtor. More specifically, there may have been a continuing
wrongful attachment from which the debtor had no recourse, even though
this attachment was constitutionally invalid. The greatest possible harm that
could have occurred to a debtor was that upon the resolution of the underly-
ing claim, the prevailing party would have been entitled to the property
regardless of the validity of the initial attachment.8 3 The net effect of the
entire process would have been to litigate the case from beginning to end
without ever addressing the constitutional claim.8 4
In short, it is impossible to determine accurately what would have hap-
pened had the debtor presented his constitutional claim in the state court
attachment proceeding. To require abstention, knowing the inadequacies of
the attachment proceedings, would have been contrary to the basic principle
that a federal court must provide relief where the state remedy is uncer-
tain. 8 5
DUE PROCESS AND HERNANDEZ v. FINLEY
A careful consideration of the four controlling decisions 8 6 addressing due
process requirements in debtor-creditor relations will underscore the de-
ficiencies of the Illinois Attachment Act. The Supreme Court, in Sniadach v.
80. Hernandez v. Finley, 471 F. Supp. at 519.
81. See note 62 supra.
82. Id.
83. Hernandez v. Finley, 471 F. Supp. at 520.
84. Id.
85. Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 444 (1977). As stated by Justice Holmes: "[W]e
ought not to leave the plaintiffs to a speculation upon what the State Court might say if an
action at law were brought." Wallace v. Hines, 253 U.S. 66, 68 (1920). This position now enjoys
the additional support of the Quern decision.
86. North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Mitchell v. W.T.
Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin.
Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969). These cases represent the Supreme Court's analysis of the due
process requirements of notice and hearing in debtor-creditor relations.
[Vol. 28:901
TRAINOR V. HERNANDEZ
Family Finance Corp.,87 squarely addressed for the first time in recent his-
tory the implications of the taking of property without due process of law.
The plaintiff in Sniadach received notice of the wage garnishment the same
day as her employer, but the Supreme Court deemed such notice insuffi-
cient"' due to the resulting hardships of such an arbitrary encroachment. 89
Both the creditor's garnishment of wages in Sniadach and the attachment of
a debtor's credit union account in Hernandez impose tremendous hardships
by making such monies inaccessible without prior notice or hearing.
Unfortunately, lack of access to one's monies is not the only way in which
an unfair deprivation can occur. Fuentes v. Shevin 90 involved a seizure of
household appliances, absent prior notice or hearing, 9 1 upon the default of
the consumer-debtors. In Fuentes, the plaintiff-consumers from Florida and
Pennsylvania had purchased their goods under revolving credit plans. 92
Their respective state statutes93 allowed seizure of their property under a
writ of replevin. 94 Neither act provided for prior notice and a hearing or an
immediate postseizure hearing. 95 The Fuentes court stated that, absent ex-
87. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
88. Id. at 340. The Wisconsin garnishment law only required notice to be served upon the
debtor within 10 days after service on the garnishee. Wis. STAT. § 267.07(1) (1973) (current
version at Wis. STAT. ANN. § 812.07(1) (West 1977)).
89. The Court's primary focus was on the deprivation to the wage earner of his earned
wages without any opportunity to be heard or to tender a defense. Justice Douglas, writing for
the Court, held that a "prejudgment garnishment of the Wisconsin type is a taking which may
impose tremendous hardship on wage earners with families to support." Sniadach v. Family
Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 340 (1969).
90. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
91. Id. at 70-72. See generally Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314
(1950), where the Court viewed the right to notice as a fundamental requirement to give the
parties an opportunity to present objections.
92. In Fuentes, the debtor was a Florida resident who purchased a stove and stereo from
Firestone. She ceased payments due to problems with servicing. Thereafter, Firestone sought
replevin. 407 U.S. at 70. In the Pennsylvania companion case, three of the four appellants
purchased personal property under installment contracts and the sellers obtained and executed
writs of replevin. The fourth appellant also had goods seized under replevin, but had a dispute
with her husband. He executed the replevin and also seized their child's belongings. Id. at 72.
93. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 78.01, .10, .13 (West 1964) (current version at FLA. STAT. ANN. §§
78.01, .10, .13, (West Supp. 1979)); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1821 (Purdon 1967) (repealed
1978); PA. R. Civ. P. 1073.
94. Both acts authorized the issuance of prejudgment writs of replevin through a summary
process of ex parte application to the court clerk accompanied by the posting of a bond for an
amount in excess of the property's value. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 73-77 (1972).
A writ of replevin is a remedy of a secured creditor that is used where it is not possible to
engage in self-help to repossess the items peaceably. Like attachment or garnishment, it is a
prejudgment remedy which involves the taking of property prior to resolution of the underlying
claim, and can impose hardships on the debtor and his/her family. Id. at 96.
95. The Florida statute provided no right to be heard until the trial on the possession. FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 78.13 (West Supp. 1972-73). Also, as with the Illinois Attachment Act, all that
was required of the creditor was the bare assertion to the court clerk that the creditor was
lawfully entitled to possession. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 78.01 (West Supp. 1972-73). The Florida
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traordinary circumstances, 9" if the right to notice and a hearing is to be
meaningful, it must be granted when the deprivation can still be pre-
vented.97 Thus, the Court held both acts unconstitutional. 98
The Court, in Sniadach and Fuentes, emphasized the debtor's property
interest and ruled that no deprivation of such an interest could occur unless
statute also provided the sheriff with the right to break open the home or building when the
debtor did not peaceably turn over the property. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 78.10 (West Supp. 1972-
73).
The Pennsylvania statute only required an ex parte application, with a bond posted by the
creditor. PA. R. Civ. P. 1073. See also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 78.07 (West Supp. 1972-73). How-
ever, unlike the Florida law, in Pennsylvania there was no requirement that there ever be a
hearing on the conflicting claims to the property. PA. R. Civ. P. 1073 (b). The reason for no
hearing was that the creditor was not obliged to initiate court action. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407
U.S. 67, 77-78 (1972).
See generally Scott v. Danaher, 343 F. Supp. 1272 (N.D. I1. 1972). In Scott, the court held
that before a person 'can be deprived of property, he must first be provided with an opportunity
to speak on his own behalf. Id. at 1275. See also Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971); Goldberg
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385 (1914).
96. Extraordinary circumstances were viewed by the court as exceptions to the due process
requirements to notice and hearing. Those exceptions included: a seizure to secure an important
governmental or general public interest; a special need for very prompt action; and situations in
which the state has kept strict control over its monopoly of legitimate force. Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. 67, 90-91 (1972).
See Brabham, Sniadach Through Di-Chem and Backwards: An Analysis of Virginia's Attach-
ment and Detinue Statutes, 12 U. PICH. L. REv. 157 (1977). This article noted that it is not
clear whether all three requirements must be met or just any one of the three. The author
concluded that any one of the three would constitute an extraordinary situation. Id. at 166. See
also Kay & Lubin, Making Sense of the Prejudgment Seizure Cases, 64 KY. L. J. 705 (1976).
Examples of cases where the extraordinary situation argument applies include: Calero-Toledo
v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974) (yacht seized with marijuana on board);
Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950) (misbranded drugs); Phillips v.
Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931) (aid in collection of taxes); Coffin Brothers & Co. v. Bennet,
277 U.S. 29 (1928) (a bank failure); United States v. Pfitsch, 256 U.S. 547 (1921) (the war effort);
North Am. Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908) (protection of public from con-
taminated food).
97. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 81 (1972). Considerable case law recognizes the waiver
of notice and a hearing, but there is a general presumption against waiver. See, e.g., D.H.
Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972) (due process rights to notice and hearing prior
to civil judgment are subject to waiver); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970) (waiver
must be knowing and intelligent, with awareness of consequences); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458 (1938) (courts do not presume acquiescence in loss of fundamental rights). See also Boddie
v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389 (1937); Ohio Bell
Tel. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292 (1937); First Nat'l Bank in DeKalb v. Keis-
man, 47 I11. 2d 364 (1970).
98. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 96 (1972). The Hernandez case also is typical of many
recent cases attacking state statutes because of the failure to satisfy the due process require-
ments of Snadach and Fuentes. See, e.g., United States Gen., Inc. v. Arndt, 417 F. Supp.
1300 (E.D. Wis. 1976); Gunter v. Merchants Warren Nat'l Bank, 360 F. Supp. 1085 (D. Me.
1973); Clement v. Four N. State Corp., 360 F. Supp. 933 (D.N.H. 1973); Trapper Brown
Constr. Co. v. Electromech, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 105 (D.N.H. 1973); Schneider v. Margossian,
349 F. Supp. 741 (D. Mass. 1972).
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timely due process protections were provided. 99 However, the Illinois At-
tachment Act failed to require notice and a hearing prior to seizure. Thus,
under the Act, the debtor may not have received notice of the attachment
until after the attachment occurred. 100
Prior notice and a hearing, however, are not absolute requirements for a
writ of attachment to issue if the procedural safeguards of Mitchell v. W.T.
Grant 101 are met. Mitchell makes prior notice and a hearing unnecessary
where: (1) the creditor alleges, under oath, facts entitling him to the writ; (2)
there is judicial control of the summary seizure, from beginning to end; and
(3) there is an immediate postseizure hearing. 10 2 At such a hearing, the
burden is on the plaintiff to prove the adequacy of the grounds upon which
the writ was issued.10 3
The Illinois Attachment Act also failed under the Mitchell exception.
Under the Act, the only requirements to obtaining a writ of attachment were
an affidavit stating the nature and amount of the claim,' 04 and a bond cover-
ing damages in the event of a wrongful attachment.' 0 5 Except for where a
claim sounded in tort, the Illinois Act had no provisions for an appearance
before the court. Otherwise, the writ was issued by the clerk of the court
upon application.'x 6 More importantly, the immediate postseizure hearing
was not available in that the return date, or attachment hearing, could have
occurred anywhere from ten to sixty days after the attachment.' 0 7
99. The Court, in Sniadach, noted that while creditors may have a legitimate claim, "recent
investigations ...disclosed the grave injustices made possible by prejudgment garnish-
ment .... Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 340 (1969). As a result, the Court
concluded, absent notice and a prior hearing, prejudgment garnishment violated the fundamen-
tal principles of due process. Id. at 342.
The Fuentes Court stated that the essential reason for the requirement of a prior hearing was
to prevent unfair and mistaken deprivations. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 97 (1972). Addi-
tionally, the Court held that "due process is afforded only by the kinds of 'notice' and 'hearing'
that are aimed at establishing the validity, or at least the probable validity, of the underlying
claim against the alleged debtor before he can be deprived of his property .... Id.
100. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 11, § 8 (1977), provided the sheriff with the right to attach. No
provision for notice was available. Section 10 of the Act stated that the defendant-debtor was to
be served with a writ in the same manner as service of summons. The time when process was
served, therefore, may have been the first time that the debtor was aware of the attachment.
Further, nothing prevented the sheriff from attachment at the time of service, or even earlier.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 11, § 10 (1977).
101. 416 U.S. 600 (1974). The debtor owed $574 on household items. As a result of his
default, the creditor submitted an affidavit of the credit manager, swearing to the truth of the
facts alleged, and swearing also that the debtor would try to dispose of the goods were they not
sequestered. Id. at 602. The request for a writ of sequestration was made to a judge of the
court rather than to a court clerk. Id. at 616. Sequestration under Louisiana law is similar to a
writ of replevin. Id.
102. Id. at 616-18.
103. Id..at 618.
104. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 11, § 2 (1977).
105. Id. §4a.
106. Id. § 2.
107. Id. § 6.
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Mitchell is also significant in that the Court, for the first time, 10 8 consid-
ered the creditor's interests in the sequestered property. 10 9 Under
Louisiana law, vendors could take a lien on the debtor's property to the
extent of the unpaid balance. 110 In the event of default, the debtor's right
to possession and title were subject to defeasance.111 Whether the Mitchell
decision affected the principles of Sniadach and Fuentes, by allowing seizure
prior to notice and a.hearing, was ultimately resolved in North Georgia
Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc. l1 2
In Di-Chem, the Supreme Court determined that the Georgia garnish-
ment statute 113 was unconstitutional because it failed to provide either prior
notice and a hearing as required by Sniadach and Fuentes, or an immediate
postseizure hearing as required by Mitchell.1 14  The Georgia statute, like
108. Fuentes and Sniadach never addressed the creditor's interest in the property. Both cases
focused on the impending harm and hardship to the debtor.
109. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. arts. 281-83, 325, 2373, 3501, 3504, 3508, 3571, 3576 (West
1961).
Justice White, dissenting in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 97 (1972), addressed the ques-
tion of protecting creditor's interests, but it was not until Mitchell that this notion was subject to
consideration by the full Court. Justice White stated that a creditor's secured interest in prop-
erty was an interest deserving of protection. He emphasized, however, that there must be a
preexisting interest in the property. Otherwise, one is merely a general unsecured creditor and
the debtor must be given notice and a hearing. Id. at 102.
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides a secured creditor with the self-help
remedy. U.C.C. § 9-503 (1972 version). Thus, state action is not involved, and therefore the
need for notice and a hearing is removed. But where the sheriff becomes involved, the remedy
is no longer private to the parties and the requirements of Sniadach and Fuentes should apply.
For a background of the constitutional implications of self-help under the U.C.C, see Boland
v. Essex County Bank & Trust Co., 361 F. Supp. 917 (D. Mass. 1973); Greene v. First Nat'l
Exch. Bank, 348 F. Supp. 672 (W.D. Va. 1972); Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal.
1972); Bichel Optical Lab, Inc. v. Marquette Nat'l Bank, 13 U.C.C. Rptr. 738 (8th Cir. 1973);
Michel v. Rex-Norect, Inc., 12 U.C.C. Rptr. 543 (D. Vt. 1972).
Commentaries in the area include: Countryman, The Bill of Rights and the Bill Collector, 15
Asuz. L. REv. 521 (1973); Mentschikoff, Peaceful Repossession under the Uniform Commercial
Code: A Constitutional and Economic Analysis, 14 WM. & MARY L. REv. 767 (1973).
110. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 2373 (West 1961) provides: "[Aifter deducting the
costs, the sheriff shall first pay the amount due the seizing creditor, then the inferior mortgages,
liens, and privileges on the property sold, and shall pay to the debtor whatever surplus may
remain."
The creditors would be lost if the debtor subsequently transferred possession. The Court was
unconvinced that the impact on the debtor, due to the deprivation of household goods, was
greater than the inability to make the creditor whole in the event of wrongful possession, de-
struction, or alienation. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant, 416 U.S. 600, 610 (1974).
111. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant, 416 U.S. 600, 604 (1974).
112. 419 U.S. 601 (1974).
113. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 46-101, -104, -401 (1979).
114. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant, 416 U.S. 600 (1974). The present status of debtor-creditor
statutes as they relate to the due process clause can best be described by Justice Powell's
concurrence in North Ga. Finishing, Inc., v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 608 (1975). Powell
was of the opinion that pregarnishment notice and a prior hearing were not constitutionally
mandated in the past, nor imposed as requirements for the future. 419 U.S. at 611. He felt that
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the Illinois Attachment Act, allowed the issuance of a writ by a clerk of the
court upon the allegation that the plaintiff had "reason to apprehend" the
amount claimed and upon the posting of a bond. 115  Unlike the earlier cases
involving consumers, Di-Chem pertained to a business debtor whose funds
were garnished, with the bank named as garnishee."l 6
The Court concluded that the Georgia Act was unconstitutional, thereby
extending the Mitchell principles to businesses. 117 The basic effect of Di-
Chein and Mitchell read together, therefore, was to extend the immediate
postseizure hearing to non-consumer debtors. 118 The Court reasoned that
corporations deprived of bank accounts suffer irreparable injury to the same
extent as consumers who are deprived of household appliances. 1 9 Thus,
Sniadach was limited to wages-"a specialized type of property presenting distinct problems in
our economic-system"-and was therefore not relevant to Di-Chem. Id.
According to Powell, due process can be completely satisfied where state law requires the
assurance of a prompt post-garnishment hearing before a judge. id. Such a hearing would afford
an opportunity to rectify any error in the decision to issue garnishment. Additionally, a prompt
post-seizure hearing coupled with the imposition of a bond would compensate a debtor for any
harms. Id. Finally, Powell was of the opinion that the prompt correction of possible error
suffices to satisfy the requirements of procedural due process. Id. Thus, it should be sufficient
for a clerk or other officer of the court to issue the original writ upon the filing of a proper
affidavit.
Comparing Fuentes and Sniadach with Mitchell and Di-Chem should bring to light the uncer-
tainty of the law in this area. Fuentes and Sniadach appear to represent the notion that a
preseizure hearing is a must. Mitchell and Di-Chem, on the other hand, support the premise
that postseizure hearings do not violate the due process clause where Mitchell protections are
available. Powell, in his concurrence to Di-Chem, takes Mitchell the next step further by pro-
viding that an affidavit to a court clerk that causes a writ to issue is within the realm of due
process as long as a state provides an immediate postseizure hearing. North Ga. Finishing, Inc.
v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 611 (1974).
The major cases in this area underscore the fact that there exists no hard and fast rule in this
area. The Supreme Court, in Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 447 (1977), also failed to
clarify a rule. The Supreme Court, while focusing primarily on abstention, did, however, make
reference to Di-Chem and Mitchell to support the notion that the Illinois Attachment Act was
not "flagrantly and patently" violative of the Constitution. Id. Although the court provided no
reasoning for this proposition, both cases advocated the state courts' use of postseizure hearings.
The majority of the Di-Chem Court compared the Georgia statute with the Mitchell decision and
found as one of its requirements an immediate postseizure hearing. North Ga. Finishing, Inc.
v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 607 (1974). Assuming this isolated aspect of Di-Chem were
applied to the Illinois Act, its constitutionality is still uncertain as the Act has no specific re-
quirement for an immediate postseizure hearing. More specifically, the hearing on the attach-
ment can be anywhere from ten to sixty days of the seizure. ILL. REv. STAT., ch. 11, § 6
(1977). Assuming that the Illinois Act was subjected to this one requirement, it's constitutional-
ity remains uncertain.
115. GA. CODE ANN. § 46-102 (1979).
116. The business-debtor filed a bond with the court on the condition that funds would be
available to pay any final judgment. North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601,
603 (1974). The debtor also filed a motion to dismiss the writ of garnishment and attacked the
garnishment procedure in light of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 604-05.




the Court, in applying the due process clause, did not distinguish between
differing types of property.
Extension of the due process requirements to both individuals and
businesses provides favorable protection to those parties whose property
would have been subject to attachment under the Illinois Attachment Act.
The Attachment Act subjected many properties to attachment, which could
have had a crippling effect upon the debtor. Specifically, the properties sub-
ject to attachment included: lands, tenements, goods, chattels, rights, cre-
dits, monies and effects of the debtor, plus any lands and tenements in
which the debtor had or may have claimed any equitable interest.1 2 0  Any
individual or business whose property is subject to attachment must be pro-
vided with prior notice and a hearing before an attachment is executed.
Under the Mitchell alternative, the writ of attachment should be evaluated
by a judge as to its sufficiency, and then immediately followed by a post-
seizure hearing. 1
2 1
In Hernandez v. Finley122 the district court, on remand, examined the
Illinois Attachment Act in accord with earlier holdings of the Supreme
Court. The Illinois Act provided neither notice and a hearing nor the
safeguards of Mitchell. Thus, the district court had ample support for its
determination that the Illinois Act fell within an exception to the Younger
abstention policy in that it was "flagrantly and patently" unconstitutional. 121
Additionally, the Supreme Court's decision to abstain in Trainor was prem-
ised on the assumption that the constitutional question could, in fact, be
raised at the state level. It was not until Finley that the district court
evaluated sections 27 and 28, and held that no such opportunity was avail-
able.12 4
120. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 11, § 8 (1977).
121. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant, 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
122. 471 F. Supp. 516 (N.D. I11. 1978).
123. In Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387 (1941), the Court stated that where a state statute is
"flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions in every clause, sentence
and paragraph, and in whatever manner and against whomever an effort might be made to
apply it," this is an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable relief. Id. at 402.
124. Hernandez v. Finley, 471 F. Supp. at 520. The decision of the district court was also
affirmed in the recent decision of Quern v. Hernandez, 99 S. Ct. 1488 (1979), where the IDPA
appealed the Finley decision. On January 26, 1979, the State of Illinois petitioned the Supreme
Court for an appeal of the Finley decision. The two issues petitioned for review were whether
or not the district court should have abstained, and whether or not the Illinois Attachment Act
provided due process protections.
The Supreme Court, in March of 1979, summarily affirmed the decision of the district court
in Quern v. Hernandez, 99 S. Ct. 1488 (1979). Apparently, the district court was correct in its
decision that abstention was improper. Initially, the Supreme Court was of the opinion that
abstention was the best policy to be followed by the federal courts. Yet the district court in
Finley found that due to the inadequacies of the state statutory procedure, abstention was not
possible. Affirmation of this decision by the Supreme Court, in Quern. establishes that absten-




The obvious consequence of the Supreme Court's affirmation of Finley in
Hernandez v. Quern is that Illinois is presently without an attachment act.
All parties that would play any role in the attachment process have been
enjoined from such acts,125 thereby leaving creditors in Illinois with one less
available remedy. Until the Illinois General Assembly makes considerable
revisions to the present statute, creditors will continue to be without the
remedy of attachment.
The status of the Illinois Attachment Act has been clarified by the Su-
preme Court's Quern decision. Although the Court did not provide reason-
ing for its decision, the reasons for the Supreme Court's affirmation of Finley
are apparent. First, the Illinois Attachment Act failed to provide the due
process requirements of notice and hearing.' 26 Second, the Finley Court
determined that the attachment hearing available under the Act was not
designed to address constitutional claims. 127 Third, when the Supreme
Court invoked the abstention doctrine in Trainor, it presupposed an ability
to address constitutional claims.' 28 Finally, it was not until Finley that the
court was put on notice that such an opportunity was not available. 129
Quern, examined in conjunction with Trainor, demonstrates the Supreme
Court's current view regarding federal court review of due process attacks of
state creditor statutes. The Supreme Court in Trainor appeared to discour-
age federal intervention in cases that attack the constitutionality of creditor
statutes that involve the taking of debtor's property without due process pro-
tections.130 Trainor is significant in its own right because the Court expres-
125. The district court in Hernandez v. Danaher granted an injunction which enjoined the
court clerks from issuing, and the sheriff from executing, the writ. 405 F. Supp. at 762. Upon
reinstating its earlier decision, the district court also reinstated the injunction. Hernandez v.
Finley, 471 F. Supp. at 522.
126. Henandez v. Danaher, 405 F. Supp. at 762.
127. Hernandez v. Finley, 471 F. Supp. at 520.
128. 431 U.S. at 441.
129. Hernandez v. Finley, 471 F. Supp. at 520.
130. The cases of Sniadach through Di-Chem specifically involved attacks against state
statutes for failure to meet the fourteenth amendment's procedural due process requirements.
In Sniadach, the Court specifically stated that the issue was not whether the Wisconsin law was
wise or unwise, because the Court does not sit as a legislative body. Sniadach v. Family Fin.
Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 339 (1969). The Court did state, however, that it could inquire into
whether there had been a taking of property without the procedural due process required of the
fourteenth amendment. Id.
The Court, in Fuentes, in an effort to prevent an arbitrary encroachment, held that the
constitutional right to be heard was a basic aspect of the duty of government. Fuentes v. She-
vin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972). The Court also noted that the issue for resolution was whether or
not the state statutes were constitutionally defective. Id.
The Mitchell Court also noted that "[t]he very nature of due process negates any concept of
inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation." Mitchell v. W.T.
Grant, 416 U.S. 600, 610 (1974).
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sed a strong policy argument in favor of abstention, preferring the state
courts to have an opportunity to handle any specific constitutional challenges
directed against their own statutes. 131  It may be that the Court has con-
cluded that the series of cases from Fuentes through Di-Chem provides
ample guidelines for a state court to determine the constitutionality of its
own statute. Such a stance allows the states to effectuate their own policies
and provide a competent forum for the vindication of any constitutional ob-
jectives against those policies.132 However, with the Court's recent affir-
mance of Finley,'3 3 the decision as to whether the constitutional claims will
be addressed by a federal or state court will depend upon whether the state
provides an adequate state statutory procedure.
Those legislators who will attempt to revive the Illinois Attachment Act
may look to two sources for guidance: the California case of Randone v.
Appellate Department of the Superior Court of Sacramento County"4 and
the Illinois Replevin Act.13 5  In Randone, which was decided shortly after
Sniadach, the California Supreme Court suggested amendments to its own
attachment statute1 36 that are relevant to the current problem in Illinois.
The Randone court placed particular emphasis on those pieces of property
which would be considered "necessities of life" 17 and discouraged their at-
tachment. 1
3 8
One commentator on Randone 139 has offered the following pertinent
suggestions: (1) do not allow attachment proceedings where the creditor
seeks to attach necessities of life140 because such a taking is so severe it
Finally, in Di-Chem, the last of four major debtor-creditor relations cases, the Court stated
that "[a]ny significant taking of property is within the purview of the Due Process Clause."
North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 606 (1974). It was not until Trainor
that abstention became the policy of the federal court. 431 U.S. at 434 (1977).
131. Id. at 441.
132. Huffman v. Pursue, 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975).
133. Quern v. Hernandez, 99 S. Ct. 1488 (1979).
134. 96 Cal. Rptr. 709, 488 P.2d 13 (1971).
135. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 119, § 1-28 (1977).
136. Randone v. Appellate Dep't of the Sup'r Court of Sacramento County, 96 Cal. Rptr.
709, 727, 488 P.2d 13, 31 (1971).
137. See note 140 infra.
138. See Note, Randone Revisited: Due Process Protection for Commercial Necessities, 26
STAN. L. REv. 673, 686 (1974).
139. Id. at 684-87.
140. The California Court in Randone enunciated for the first time the necessities of life
principle. The court cited Sniadach, in which the garnishment of wages was found to be an
undue hardship. The Randone court stated that such hardship did not end with garnishment of
earned wages in the hands of an employer and that hardship can occur where the debtor places
those moneys in a bank account which are subsequently attached. Randone v. Appellate Dep't
of the Sup'r Court of Sacramento County, 5 Cal. 3d 536, 559, 488 P.2d 13, 28, 96 Cal. Rptr.
709, 724 (1971). In both instances, the attachment serves to deprive the debtor of assets used
for everyday expenses. The court also stated that extreme hardship arises not only from attach-
ment of liquid assets, such as wages or bank account proceeds, but also from the summary
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should not be allowed without notice and a hearing; (2) the taking of a
necessity must be preceded by a hearing on the validity of the underlying
claim; and (3) the necessity of life principle also should apply to commercial
debtors where there is an attempt to take accounts receivable, bank ac-
counts, and/or inventory.
14 1
The effect of these suggestions is that the court or legislature will have to
determine whether the items subject to seizure are necessities, thereby not
imposing undue hardship upon the debtor either individually or commer-
cially. Assuming an item is a necessity, either it should be totally excluded
from attachment, or prior notice and a hearing must be available before
attachment may occur. Further, the statute should encourage creditors to
choose those items for attachment whose seizure will satisfy their claims, yet
not have a crippling effect upon a family or business.
With respect to legislative alternatives, the Illinois Replevin Act 142 is a
viable model, as it provides notice and a hearing prior to seizure.143 Under
the Replevin Act, the defendant receives five days notice before an action in
replevin is commenced. 1 44  No writ of replevin may issue, nor may property
be seized, prior to notice and a hearing.145  The right to notice and hearing
may not be waived by any consumer. 146 Where a waiver otherwise takes
seizure of personal property such as refrigerators, stoves, sewing machines, and furniture of all
kinds, i.e., items that might loosely be described as "necessities" in our modem society. Id. at
29.
Extending the necessities principle to commercial debtors, the Randone court noted that the
hardship and injustice stressed in Sniadach was equally applicable to businesses, whose account
receivables should not be frozen prior to having their liability established. Id. at 725, 488 P.2d
at 29. To deprive a debtor of those necessities essential for ordinary day-to-day living may give
the creditor enormous leverage over the debtor. This may cause the debtor to settle the cred-
itor's claim quickly, due to the pressure of such a deprivation. The Randone court found that
debtors are denied a "meaningful" opportunity to be heard on the merits where they are de-
prived of the essentials needed to live, work, or support a family. Id. at 30.
141. Additional suggestions in the' article that are worthy of consideration are as follows: (1)
allow a taking in extraordinary situations, but specifically prohibit ex parte proceedings where
statutory proceedings are involved; (2) adopt procedures similiar to Article 9 of the U.C.C.
whereby a lien can be filed with the Secretary of State instead of depriving the debtor of its
possession; (3) give the debtors the option of substituting the particular property to be attached,
rather than the creditor's choices-this property must be of significant value to cover his
obligations-and finally, (4) allow the creditor the right, as under Article 9-503 of the U.C.C., to
have the debtor make the goods available at a place convenient to both parties. Randone Revi-
sited: Due Process Protection for Commercial Necessities, 26 STAN. L. REv. 673, 684-87 (1974).
Creditors would not be without a remedy, however, in that they could still attach after a
hearing on the merits, or in the alternative, file a lien against the debtor's property.
142. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 119, § 1-22 (1977).
143. Id. § 4a.
144. Id.
145. Id. The requirements for notice and hearing are not absolute. If the court finds seizure
necessary to prevent the sale, destruction, or transfer of the property by the debtor, seizure will
occur. Id. § 4b.
146. Id. § 4a.
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place, it must be in writing and given voluntarily, intelligently, and know-
ingly. 147 It is not clear why the state legislature has never provided the
Illinois Attachment Act with analogous provisions. In view of the Act's re-
cent invalidation, such a plan should be considered by the legislature.
CONCLUSION
There is a clear judicial movement'" toward urging states to rewrite or
amend their present statutes affecting debtor-creditor relations. Due process
is of major importance to debtors and unfair deprivation ultimately must
yield to such protections. Statutes, therefore, must provide the prior notice
and hearing required by Fuentes and Sniadach or the alternate postseizure
hearing provided in Mitchell and Di-Chem.
Assuming a question regarding due process reaches a federal court, the
position of the Supreme Court appears to be clear. Unless the federal court
determines that the state procedure is inadequate, the abstention doctrine
will apply. Younger v. Harris initially established the notion that abstention
should occur where the federal plaintiff has an adequate remedy at the state
level.149 Yet, it was not until Quern that the federal courts ceased to pre-
suppose the opportunity to raise at the state level, and to have timely de-
cided there, the federal issues involved.
Thus, in future litigation, federal courts will not abstain from hearing
constitutional attacks on state statutes unless the state courts in which the
claims arise provide an adequate statutory procedure for the resolution of
constitutional claims. Therefore, states with adequate statutory procedures
will be able to consider attacks against their debtor-creditor statutes free of




148. See note 130 supra.
149. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 40 (1971).
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